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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the role of financial sector policies in generating new 
knowledge, drawing on the experience of one of the fastest growing and largest developing countries. 
Using relatively long time series data, the results in this paper indicate that interest rate restraints help 
generate knowledge in India’s economy. Other financial repressionist policies, in the form of high 
reserve and liquidity requirements as well as significant directed credit controls, appear to have a 
dampening effect on ideas production. The results lend some support to the argument that some form of 
financial sector reforms may help stimulate economic growth via increasing innovative activity. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of finance in the process of technological innovation can be traced to the early 
work of Schumpeter (1911), who argues that adequate credit is required to facilitate the widespread 
adoption of new technologies. Hence, the availability of financial instruments, services and institutions 
is closely related to the course of technological change.1 Recent developments in the theoretical growth 
literature have continued to emphasize the importance of finance in explaining innovative growth. In 
the models developed by de la Fuente and Marín (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998) and Aghion et al. 
(2005), the relationship between finance and growth is analyzed in the context of innovation-based 
growth models. These models predict that financial market imperfections prevent innovators from 
adequately accessing external finance. The removal of credit constraints, which can be achieved 
through financial market development or financial sector reforms, makes credit more readily available 
to entrepreneurs and enables them to undertake inventive activity.  
However, despite the important role of finance in facilitating the diffusion of new technologies 
and in the undertaking of innovative activity, as illustrated by the theoretical contributions of the above 
studies, the issue of what kind of financial policies contribute to innovation has not yet received much 
attention. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by providing an empirical 
assessment of the influence of various financial sector policies on innovative activity with a case study 
of a large developing country. While the finance and development literature focuses on financial 
liberalization (see, e.g., Demetriades and Luintel, 1997; Demetriades et al., 1998; Ang and McKibbin, 
2007), a more satisfactory approach to assessing the effect of financial sector reforms would explicitly 
account for each component of the reform program. This would provide a more complete analysis of 
the costs and benefits associated with financial repression and liberalization. Thus, the overall 
effectiveness of the entire reform program would depend on each policy type. Analysis performed at 
the disaggregated level also helps identify an appropriate mix of financial liberalization and 
repressionist policies that is effective at stimulating innovative activity.  
Using annual time series data for over half a century, the present study attempts to address the 
question of how government intervention in the financial system (including interest rate controls, 
directed credit programs and reserve and liquidity requirements) affects the evolution of knowledge 
production in India. We focus our analysis on India for several reasons. First, empirical research on 
endogenous growth models has focused exclusively on the U.S. and other OECD countries due to the 
                                                 
1 For more discussions on Schumpeter’s work on innovation and technical change, see Nelson and Winter (1982a, b), Dosi 
(1990) and Nelson (1996, 2005), among others. 
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lack of adequate and reliable R&D data for developing countries (see, e.g., Zachariadis, 2003; Ha and 
Howitt, 2007). So far there has been no case study evidence documented for developing countries.  
Second, India provides an ideal ground for further analysis given that it has recently emerged as 
one of the fastest growing developing nations, and has also undergone significant financial sector 
reforms. Finally, the availability of long time series data on R&D going as far back as 1950 provides an 
added incentive for this research given that R&D data for developing countries are particularly scant. In 
this connection, it is worth noting that a majority of OECD countries have data starting only from 1965. 
The availability of a set of sufficiently long time series data allows for a meaningful time series 
investigation. This is important given that economic growth is a long-run phenomenon, which 
necessitates analyzing the evolution of the relevant variables over time in order to relate the findings to 
policy designs.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experience 
of technological development and financial liberalization in India. Section 3 sets out the innovation-
driven endogenous growth framework. It is augmented to take into consideration the influence of 
financial sector policies in producing knowledge. Data and construction of variables are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 describes the econometric techniques employed in this study. The estimated results 
are presented and analysed in Section 6. Some robustness checks are provided in Section 7, and the last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Inventive Activity and Financial Reforms in India 
After achieving independence in 1947, India’s technology policy was focused on acquiring 
better technology from abroad, paving the way for rapid industrial growth over the following few 
decades. Motivated by the profitability of independent technological work, there was a shift in 
preference from foreign to indigenous technology in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, inflows of 
technology were arranged through licensing that was subject to strict controls. MNCs were allowed to 
participate only in sectors in which local technology was unavailable (Lall, 1982). Emphasis has been 
placed on the effective absorption and adaptation of imported technology through the encouragement 
of more investment in engineering and in-house R&D activities. This is reflected by the granting of 
generous fiscal incentives and the establishment of R&D centers, which increased substantially from 
106 in 1973 to 930 in 1986 (Sahu, 1998). Science and technology personnel increased markedly from 
about 0.2 million in 1950 to more than 3.8 million in 1990. R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
increased considerably from just 0.05% in 1950 to 0.8% in 1990. While these figures may seem small 
4 
 
compared to some of the OECD countries, they are nonetheless very impressive for a developing 
nation. Some liberalization efforts in industrial licensing and capital goods imports were initiated in the 
late 1980s to facilitate inflows of foreign technology. Between 1950 and 1990, over 140,000 foreign 
collaboration proposals were approved by the government. India’s growing technological capability has 
subsequently enabled it to become a key player in the generation of industrial technology exports 
among the NICs. 
Alongside the technological development, there has also been significant growth in the financial 
sector. The provision of finance for investments in local R&D has significantly enhanced the levels of 
absorptive and adaptive capacities in the technological sector, allowing the effective assimilation of 
foreign technology. The number of scheduled commercial banks rose sharply, thus providing 
significant financial resources to fuel industrial growth. Rapid expansion in bank branches has also 
facilitated the mobilization of savings, contributing to a tremendous increase in intermediary activity. 
In terms of financial policy, the Reserve Bank of India gradually imposed more controls over the 
financial system by introducing interest rate controls in the 1960s. The statutory liquidity ratio was 
raised from 25% in 1966 to 38% in 1989, and the cash reserve rate increased considerably from 3% to 
15% during the same period. These requirements enabled the Reserve Bank to purchase government 
securities at low cost. The extent of directed credit programs has also increased markedly since the 
nationalization of the 14 largest private banks in 1969. A number of priority lending rates were set at 
levels well below those that would prevail in the free market. This process culminated in the late 1980s 
when directed lending was more than 40% of the total.  
The major phase of financial liberalization was undertaken in 1991 as part of the broader 
economic reform in response to the balance of payments crisis of 1990-91. The objective was to 
redirect the entire orientation of India’s financial development strategy from its position as a financially 
repressed system to that of a more open system so as to provide a greater role for markets in price 
determination and resource allocation. Consequently, interest rates were gradually liberalized and 
reserve and liquidity ratios were significantly reduced. The industrial licensing requirements that 
restricted entry and expansion of both domestic and foreign firms were relaxed in the same year. The 
equity market was formally liberalized in 1992, allowing foreign investors to access the domestic 
equity market directly. The formerly restrictive capital account regime has also become more open. The 
regulatory framework was also significantly strengthened. In addition, entry restrictions were 
deregulated in 1993, resulting in the establishment of more private and foreign banks. Regulations on 
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portfolio and direct investment have since been eased. The exchange rate was unified in 1993 and most 
restrictions on current account transactions were eliminated in 1994.2 
Following the financial liberalization measures, the volume of funds raised domestically has 
grown substantially. Increased access to credit has facilitated the undertaking of R&D activity and 
encouraged more investment in education, providing a large pool of scientific and technical personnel 
to the technological sector. Since liberalization, R&D personnel and expenditure have grown rapidly in 
India, increasing more than twofold in terms of personnel employed and over fivefold for expenditure, 
over the period 1991-2005. The transfer of technology has been greatly facilitated in recent years 
following India’s accession to the WTO, where minimum standards of patent protection are mandated 
by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that came into 
force in 1995.  
 
3. Analytical Framework  
3.1 The R&D-based endogenous growth models 
In this section, we present the analytical framework underlying our modeling strategy. 
Assuming a standard neoclassical production function with constant returns, we can write the aggregate 
output at time t, Yt, as: 
( , )t t t tY A f K L=                (1) 
where At is the stock of knowledge or ideas, Kt is the capital stock and Lt is the number of workers. The 
R&D-based endogenous growth literature (see, e.g., Romer, 1990) suggests that the rate of ideas 
production ( Ag ) depends on the growth rate of the R&D stock of knowledge: 
t t
A
t t
A SKg
A SK
ρ
• •
= =                (2) 
where tSK  is the stock of R&D knowledge. Griffith et al. (2003, 2004), among others, suggest that for 
low rates of depreciation of the R&D stock of knowledge, we can write Eq. (2) as: 
t t
t
XA A
Q
υ• ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                (3) 
                                                 
2 As a result of the significant devaluation of the rupee following the balance of payments crisis, a liberalized exchange rate 
system was introduced in 1992. This led to the introduction of a dual exchange rate system, which consisted of an official 
rate for selected public and private transactions and a market-determined rate for other transactions. The exchange rate 
regime was later unified in March 1993. 
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where tX  is R&D input and tQ  is product variety or the number of product lines. The ratio ( / )tX Q  is 
commonly referred to as research intensity. R&D input is divided by product variety since the 
effectiveness of R&D is diluted due to the proliferation of products when an economy expands (Ha and 
Howitt, 2007). 
 
3.2 Financial Sector Policies and Knowledge Production 
 In their seminal work, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) noted that financial repression was 
largely accountable for the poor economic performance of developing countries in the 1960s, where 
low saving and credit rationing were widely observed. Investment suffered both in terms of quantity 
and quality as funds were allocated at the discretion of policy makers. They challenged the financial 
repression ideology and provided a new paradigm in the design of financial sector policies. Their 
theories proposed that distortions in the financial system, such as loans issued at artificially low interest 
rates, directed credit programs and high reserve requirements would reduce saving, retard capital 
accumulation and prevent efficient resource allocation. The elimination of these distortions would 
significantly deepen financial systems and therefore foster economic growth. 
Recent developments in the theories of endogenous growth that consider financial factors are in 
agreement with the McKinnon-Shaw financial liberalization thesis. Financial sector reforms facilitate 
inventive activity for a number of reasons. In the work of de la Fuente and Marín (1996), the 
relationship between finance and growth is analyzed in a model of product innovation in which 
efficiency of financial systems arises endogenously. Risk aversion and private information in R&D 
activity lead to a moral hazard problem, and this makes innovative activity unattractive for risk-averse 
entrepreneurs. This problem, however, can be mitigated through improved monitoring by financial 
systems, which allow intermediaries to offer better insurance terms. Hence, the formulation of 
appropriate financial policy aimed at improving the monitoring system would yield a higher level of 
innovative activity. 
Using a product variety model, Blackburn and Hung (1998) postulate that firms have incentives 
to hide successful R&D activity to avoid repaying their loans. Such a problem of moral hazard gives 
rise to the enforcement of incentive-compatible loan contracts through costly monitoring systems. In 
their model, financial liberalization allows financial intermediaries to diversify among a large number 
of projects, thus significantly reduces delegation costs. The lower costs of monitoring spur innovative 
activity and technological development. More recently, in the innovation-based growth model 
developed by Aghion et al. (2005), it is assumed that firms can conceal the results of successful 
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innovations and thereby avoid repaying their creditors. A low degree of creditor protection makes fraud 
an inexpensive option, and this limits firms’ access to external finance, which discourages the 
production of ideas. Financial liberalization tends to increase the hiding costs by providing better laws 
and institutions. This makes credit more readily available to entrepreneurs and allows them to 
undertake innovative activity.  
However, some counter arguments suggest that financial reforms may not necessarily lead to 
higher inventive activity. For instance, the neostructuralist contributions of van Wijnbergen (1982) and 
Taylor (1983) suggest that the impact of lower taxation on financial systems may reduce the flow of 
credit to the private sector. Since the formal financial systems are subject to reserve requirements, 
which involve a leakage in the intermediation process, the neostructuralists argue that curb 
(unorganized) markets perform more efficiently in intermediating savers and investors. A rise in bank 
deposit rates following financial liberalization induces households to substitute curb market loans for 
bank deposits, resulting in a fall in the supply of loanable funds. Thus, in the presence of efficient curb 
markets, removing interest rate restraints tends to discourage lending to the private sector, thereby 
resulting in a lower level of innovative activity. 
Stiglitz (1994) also argues that interest rate restraints may lead to higher financial saving when 
good governance is present in financial systems. When depositors perceive restrictions as policies 
aimed at enhancing the stability of the financial system, they may well be more willing to keep their 
savings in the form of bank deposits, thereby providing more resources for innovative investment in the 
absence of perfect capital mobility. Hellmann et al. (1996) show that in a competitive equilibrium, 
banks have no incentive to attract new customers and deepen market penetration since their profit 
margin on deposits is zero due to intense competition. However, if the government imposed a deposit 
rate ceiling, banks can make positive returns and therefore have an incentive to attract more depositors, 
as long as the market is not fully penetrated. This reasoning suggests that deposit rate controls can 
induce banks to spend more resources on attracting deposits, thus enabling more innovative activity to 
be carried out. 
Using a dynamic stochastic oligopoly model, Stadler (1992) shows that the optimal innovative 
activity is inversely related to interest rates. This result is intuitive given that a reduction in interest rate 
restraints generally results in higher costs of capital, thereby retarding innovative initiatives in the 
technological sector. More recently, using an occupational choice model with moral hazard, Emran and 
Stiglitz (2009) show that deposit rate controls can foster the discovery of entrepreneurial talent by 
banks and provide incentives for entrepreneurial learning in the industrial sector of a developing 
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country. Their results suggest that interest rate restraints, in the form of deposit rate controls, can result 
in the successful development of industrial entrepreneurship. 
In the case of reserve requirements, Courakis (1984) shows that under the condition where the 
demand for loanable funds is not perfectly inelastic, higher reserve requirements may increase the 
profit-maximization deposit rate and hence the volume of loanable funds. Using a general equilibrium 
model, Bencivenga and Smith (1992) show that the optimal degree of financial repression depends on 
the size of government deficits. In the presence of large government deficits, it will be desirable to 
impose higher reserve requirements. Their model also implies that financial liberalization will not 
increase innovative activity, since savings in the formal sector translate into lower investment 
compared to savings in the informal sector, due to the absence of reserve requirements. 
The implementation of directed credit programs generally involves the administered allocation 
of loans to priority sectors, in India’s case mainly agriculture and small-scale industry (rather than the 
knowledge sector). Without such interventions, banks generally will not fund those activities with low 
returns. Although the McKinnon-Shaw thesis advocates the removal of directed credit programs since 
they displace investment projects with potentially higher returns, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that 
financial liberalization is unlikely to result in allocative efficiency. This is because under asymmetric 
information, banks will practice credit rationing and be reluctant to raise interest rates in response to 
higher demand for loans, due to adverse selection problems. According to Schwarz (1992), directed 
credit programs may lead to increased investments in the targeted sectors. If more funds are allocated 
to the high-tech sector, an economy-wide increase in innovative activity will be expected. However, the 
allocation of funds involving the government in developing countries may be subject to the risk of 
biased assessments and corruption, and often results in sub-optimal outcomes (Emran and Stiglitz, 
2009). Given the above, it appears that the impact of each of these financial sector policies on 
innovative activity is theoretically ambiguous. It is therefore ultimately an empirical issue. 
 Based on the above discussion, we augment the standard knowledge production function to 
consider the role of finance so that the empirical relationship between knowledge production and 
financial sector policies can be characterized as follows (see also Ang and Madsen, 2008): 
 
 1 2 3ln ln ln( / )t t t t t t tA A X Q IRR DCP RLRα β χ δ δ δ ε= + + + + + +?          (4) 
 
where tA?  is the amount of new knowledge or ideas produced, tA  measures the stock of knowledge or 
ideas, ( / )tX Q  is research intensity and tε  is Gaussian errors. The empirical specification of the 
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knowledge production function in Eq. (4) considers how each type of financial repressionist policy, 
namely interest rate restraints (IRRt), directed credit programs (DCPt) and reserve and liquidity 
requirements (RLRt), impacts on the production of knowledge in India’s economy. While both β  and 
χ  are expected to carry a positive value, the expected signs for δ’s cannot be determined a priori since 
the impact of each policy type on ideas production is theoretically ambiguous. 
 
4. Data and Construction of Variables 
4.1 Patent data 
We use patent data as the proxy for innovation activity. The domestic stock of knowledge ( tA ) 
is constructed based on the number of domestic patents applied for ( tA? ). It is computed using the 
perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 10%. Data over the period 1919-1950 are used 
to obtain a measure of the initial knowledge stock in 1950. The initial knowledge stock is set equal to 
the number of patents in 1919 divided by the depreciation rate plus the average growth in patents over 
the period 1919-1950, which is the steady-state capital stock in standard neoclassical growth models. 
The patent data are obtained from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).3 The patent 
statistics reported in WIPO are based on information provided by the patent offices. The data are 
publicly available over a very large time span. Continuous patent data for India are available annually 
although there are some missing years for which we interpolate the data. While the WIPO data may be 
subject to heterogeneity in the patent systems, rendering patent counts not comparable across countries, 
this does not pose any issue for case studies such as the present one.   
The use of patent data as a measure of innovation, however, is not free from criticism. For 
instance, as highlighted by Eaton et al. (2004), the data provide no information regarding whether the 
patents filed in different offices reflect the same invention. Moreover, the number of patent applications 
may change following a radical reform in the patent laws, but this is not necessarily translated into a 
change in innovative activity. Other problems which have been highlighted in the literature include: 
only a fraction of invention is patented (Cohen et al., 2000), patents are applied for due to strategic 
reasons (Granstrand, 1999), and an increase in patent application is associated with the advent of 
computerized search (Hall et al., 2002). Thus, it appears that patent counts are, at best, a noisy indicator 
for innovative activity. Nevertheless, in the absence of a perfect indicator, patent statistics remain one 
of the most commonly used measures of inventive activity, As Griliches (1990) notes, despite all the 
                                                 
3 The number of patent counts is based on the patent filing date. It refers to an application filed at the Indian Patent Office 
by a domestic resident. The patent statistics can be downloaded from http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/.  
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difficulties associated with the use of patent data, they remain an important source for the analysis of 
the process of innovation. 
 
4.2 Measures of R&D activity 
R&D labor ( tN ) is used as the measure for R&D input ( tX ). It refers to the number of 
scientists and technicians engaged in R&D activity. The data are collected from various publications of 
“R&D Statistics” by the Department of Science and Technology and Planning Commission, 
Government of India. Some missing data between years are interpolated. Product variety ( tQ ) is 
measured by number of workers ( tL ). The fully-endogenous model of Aghion and Howitt (1998) 
predicts that product variety is proportional to the labor force in the long run. A larger labor force 
allows more people to enter an industry with a new product. This results in more horizontal 
innovations, diluting the beneficial effect of R&D input. Some adjustments for the measure of product 
variety is necessary, given that there is a tendency for decreasing returns to R&D due to the increasing 
complexity of innovations (Ha and Howitt, 2007). Thus, we also consider the following three 
additional measures of research intensity: /t t tN h L , /t t tN a L  and /t t t tN a h L , where ta  is total factor 
productivity and th  is an index of human capital. These additional measures therefore account for 
productivity or human capital adjustments or both.  
Total factor productivity ( ta ) is computed as 
1/t t tY K L
π π− . We use gross domestic product at 
constant prices as the measure of real output ( tY ). Real capital stock ( tK ) is computed using the 
perpetual inventory method. A depreciation rate of 10% and the growth rate of gross capital formation 
at constant prices during the sample period 1950-2005 are used to obtain the initial stock for the year 
1950. Following the established practice in the literature, capital’s share of income (π ) is assumed to 
be 0.3. These data are obtained directly from the National Accounts Statistics published by the 
Government of India. Data for number of workers ( tL ) are compiled from the Penn World Table. 
Human capital ( th ) is computed using the Mincerian approach, i.e., t
s
th e
θ= . The data for average 
years of schooling for the population over 25 years old (st) are taken from the Barro-Lee data set. θ  is 
set to 0.048, following the estimate of  Psacharopoulos (1994) for India. 
Figure 1 shows the number of patents filed by domestic residents in India over the period 1950-
2005. While patenting activity increased rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, there was little variation in the 
amount of inventive activity recorded over the next two decades. However, it is evident that the number 
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of patents filed has increased significantly since the early 1990s, coinciding with the launch of a series 
of financial liberalization programs. 
 
Figure 1: Number of patents filed by domestic residents (on log scale) 
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4.3 Measures of financial sector policies 
As illustrated in Eq. (4), we consider three types of financial sector policies: 1) interest rate 
restraints; 2) directed credit programs; and 3) reserve and liquidity requirements. These financial policy 
measures are directly obtained or compiled from the Annual Report and the Report on Currency and 
Finance of the Reserve Bank of India. To provide a measure of the interest rate restraints (IRRt), we 
follow the approach of Demetriades and Luintel (1997) by collecting six interest rate repressionist 
policies imposed on the Indian financial system. These include a fixed deposit rate, a deposit rate 
ceiling, a deposit rate floor, a fixed lending rate, a lending rate ceiling and a lending rate floor. An 
overall summary measure of interest rate restraints is obtained using the method of principal 
component analysis by considering the first three principal components for which their eigenvalues are 
greater than one (see Johnson and Wichern, 2002). They can jointly account for 85% of the total 
variation. 
The resulting index is presented in Figure 2. As is evident, the financial system in India appears 
quite liberal in the 1950s since no interest rate controls were imposed during that period. The first 
restriction was introduced in 1963 in the form of a maximum lending rate.  After this, the index follows 
an upward trend reaching a peak during the period 1975-1980. In the early 1980s, it moves downwards, 
following the introduction of some deregulation measures, before bouncing back again in 1987. 1988 
saw another peak, coinciding with the implementation of various interest rate controls. A major reform 
in interest rate policy occurred in the early 1990s when the Reserve Bank allowed banks to determine 
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their own interest rates. In recent years, the extent of interest rate restraints was further moderated, 
towards the level of late 1960s, and has remained fairly stable since then.  
 
Figure 2: Index of interest rate restraints (IRRt) 
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Unlike Malaysia for which the priority sector target lending rates are directly available (see Ang 
and McKibbin, 2007), India has no direct de jure measure of directed credit programs (DCPt). 
Therefore, we follow the approach of Demetriades and Luintel (1997) by using a de facto measure, 
which involves measuring the share of actual directed credit in total credit. Specifically, it is measured 
by 0, 1, 2 and 3 when the programs cover zero, up to 20%, 21% to 40%, and more than 40%, 
respectively, of total bank loans.4 Figure 3 shows that the Reserve Bank progressively imposed more 
directed credit controls over the financial system from the early 1960s, providing subsidized credit to 
certain priority sectors, mainly agriculture and small-scale manufacturing. The extent of these programs 
reached its peak in the late 1980s. Although efforts were made to reduce directed credit controls 
following the liberalization, it is evident that significant restrictions still remain in place. 
The measure for reserve and liquidity requirements (RLRt) is given by the sum of the cash 
liquidity ratio and the statutory reserve ratio. The former requires banks to hold part of their deposits in 
the form of cash balances at the Reserve Bank, whereas the latter imposes a requirement for banks to 
keep a share of their assets in government securities at below-market interest rates. Figure 4 shows how 
reserve and liquidity requirements have evolved over time. Historically, the cash reserve ratio was kept 
low, at 3%-3.5% during the 1950s and 1960s. The ratio was gradually raised to 15% in 1990 to 
increase cash balances. Similarly, the statutory liquidity requirement was raised from 20% in 1950 to 
                                                 
4 We have also considered the share of actual directed credit in total credit in the estimation in order to allow for more 
variation in the series. However, the results do not vary in any significant way. 
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38.5% in 1990, enabling the government to obtain cheap finance. Both requirements have fallen 
significantly following the liberalization initiated in 1991. Currently, the cash reserve ratio and 
statutory liquidity requirement stand at 5% and 25% of bank deposits, respectively.  
 
Figure 3: Directed credit programs (DCPt) 
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Figure 4: Reserve and liquidity requirements (RLRt) 
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We employ three unit root tests to assess the order of integration of the underlying variables - 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowiski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) tests. The ADF and PP test the null of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity whereas 
the KPSS tests the null of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root. The results, which are not 
reported here to conserve space but are available upon request, show that all variables appear to be 
either stationary, i.e. I(0), or integrated at order one, i.e., I(1). Given that none of the variables appears 
to be integrated at an order higher than one, this allows legitimate use of the cointegration procedures 
proposed in the next section. 
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5. Estimation Techniques 
The dynamic adjustment of the ideas generation process can be characterized by a conditional 
ECM, which can be used to test for the existence of a long-run relationship using the ARDL bounds 
test developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and the ECM test of Banerjee et al. (1998). The former involves 
a standard F-test whereas the latter is a simple t-test. Accordingly, the underlying error-correction 
model can be formulated as: 
0 0 1 , 1 0 ,
1 1 0 1
ln ln ln
p pk k
t t j j t i t i ji j t i t
j i i j
A A DET A DETα β β γ γ ε− − − −
= = = =
Δ = + + + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ ∑∑? ? ?        (5) 
where tA?  is the number of patents applied for by domestic residents and DETt is a vector of the 
determinants of innovative activity, which includes ln tA , ln( / )tX Q , tIRR , tDCP  and tRLR .  
The above can be estimated by OLS. Pesaran and Shin (1998) show that the OLS estimators of 
the short-run parameters are consistent and the ARDL based estimators of the long-run coefficients are 
super-consistent in small sample sizes. Hence, valid inferences on the long-run parameters can be made 
using standard normal asymptotic theory. The main advantage of this approach is that it can be applied 
to the model regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0) or I(1).  
Specifically, two separate statistics are employed to test for the existence of a long-run 
relationship in Eq. (5): 1) an F-test for the joint significance of coefficients of lagged levels terms of 
the conditional ECM ( 0 0 1: ... 0kH β β β= = = = ), and 2) a t-test for the significance of the coefficient 
associated with 1ln tA −?  ( 0 0: 0H β = ). The test for cointegration is provided by two asymptotic critical 
value bounds when the independent variables are either I(0) or I(1). The lower bound assumes all the 
independent variables are I(0), and the upper bound assumes they are I(1). If the test statistics exceed 
their respective upper critical values, the null is rejected and we can conclude that a long-run 
relationship exists. The above ARDL model also provides a convenient step to derive the long-run 
estimates and short-run dynamics for the ideas production function, as discussed by Pesaran and Shin 
(1998). 
 
6. Empirical Results 
The cointegration tests on the knowledge production equation are performed by regressing the 
conditional error-correction model in Eq. (5). To ascertain the existence of a level relationship between 
the variables, this requires satisfying both the F- and the t-tests. Table 1 gives the F-statistics for the 
ARDL bounds tests, t-statistics for the ECM test, model selection criteria AIC and SBC, and several 
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diagnostic test statistics for the model up to two lags. The table contains four columns, where each 
column corresponds to the estimation results using different measures of research intensity ( / )tX Q .  
 
Table 1: Cointegration tests  
 Model A 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N L=  
Model B 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N hL=  
Model C 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N aL=  
Model D 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N ahL=  
 1p =  2p =  1p =  2p =  1p =  2p =  1p =  2p =  
ARDL bounds test 
(Pesaran et al. 2001) 5.906
*** 4.601** 6.146*** 5.147*** 5.809*** 5.264*** 5.591*** 5.297*** 
ECM test 
(Banerjee et al., 1998) -5.450
*** -4.766** -5.540*** -5.067*** -5.203*** -5.025*** -5.099*** -5.061*** 
AIC -4.167 -4.287 -4.184 -4.336 -4.143 -4.301 -4.123 -4.299 
SBC -3.504 -3.394 -3.521 -3.445 -3.480 -3.408 -3.460 -3.407 
2
NORMALχ  0.926 (0.624) 
1.950 
(0.377) 
0.879 
(0.644) 
2.065 
(0.356) 
0.477 
(0.787) 
1.448 
(0.484) 
0.561 
(0.755) 
0.953 
(0.621) 
2 (1)SERIALχ  4.497
** 
(0.041) 
0.926 
(0.336) 
7.146*** 
(0.008) 
0.590 
(0.442) 
8.846*** 
(0.003) 
0.082 
(0.774) 
8.857*** 
(0.003) 
0.148 
(0.699) 
2 (2)SERIALχ  6.148
** 
(0.046) 
1.308 
(0.519) 
7.153** 
(0.028) 
0.927 
(0.629) 
9.033** 
(0.011) 
0.139 
(0.933) 
9.016** 
(0.011) 
0.202 
(0.904) 
2
ARCHχ  0.003 (0.955) 
1.109 
(0.292) 
0.016 
(0.898) 
0.907 
(0.341) 
1.981 
(0.159) 
1.028 
(0.311) 
3.678* 
(0.055) 
0.707 
(0.401) 
2
WHITEχ  24.125 (0.116) 
15.699 
(0.868) 
23.506 
(0.133) 
15.826 
(0.863) 
23.137 
(0.145) 
16.878 
(0.815) 
23.191 
(0.143) 
17.358 
(0.791) 
Notes: p is the lag length. The test statistics of the bounds tests are compared against the critical values reported in Pesaran 
et al. (2001). The estimation allows for an unrestricted intercept and no trend. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical value bounds 
for the F-test are (2.26, 3.35), (2.62, 3.79) and (3.41, 4.68), and for the t-test are (-2.57, -3.86), (-2.86, -4.19) and (-3.43, -
4.79), respectively. 2NORMALχ refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic of the test for normal residuals, 2 (1)SERIALχ  and 2 (2)SERIALχ  are 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistics for no first and second-order serial relationship, respectively, 2ARCHχ is the Engle’s test 
statistic for no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, and 2WHITEχ  denotes the White’s test statistic to test for 
homoskedastic errors. Numbers in parentheses indicate p-values. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
 
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of no level knowledge production equation is firmly 
rejected at the 1% significance level in most cases, irrespective of the lag length and measures of 
research intensity chosen. This provides strong support for the existence of a long-run relationship 
between knowledge production and its determinants. No evidence of cointegration is found when other 
variables are used as the dependent variables, suggesting that these variables can be interpreted as long-
run forcing variables explaining ln tA? . We do not find any evidence of non-normality, serial 
correlation, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, and functional misspecification at the 
conventional significance levels, when the lag length is chosen to be two across all models. However, 
the choice of a more parsimonious dynamic structure of one lag leads to some problems of serial 
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correlations. We will therefore choose a richer dynamic structure of two lags for the remaining 
analyses, as also suggested by the AIC. 
Table 2 presents the results for the knowledge production model estimated using the ARDL 
procedure. It is evident that the stock of knowledge enters the long-run knowledge production equation 
significantly at the 1% level with the expected sign. Specifically, the coefficients of the stock of 
knowledge variables are found to be in the range of 0.823-0.861. The measures of research intensity are 
found to have an economically and statistically significant effect on knowledge production. Its effect is 
found to be greatest when the labor force is adjusted for productive efficiency.  
Interestingly, financial sector policies appear to have mixed effects on knowledge creation. In 
particular, an increase in interest rate restraints is found to have a significant positive impact on 
innovative activity. The estimated elasticity of patenting activity with respect to a steady-state increase 
in the index of interest rate restraints ranges from 0.019 to 0.041. With regard to directed credit 
programs, our results suggest that an increase in the extent of directed credit controls discourages 
innovations, although the effect of directed credit programs is found to be statistically significant only 
in Models C and D. The estimates are found to be -0.018 and -0.019, respectively. Finally, the results 
also suggest that higher reserve and liquidity requirements tend to discourage knowledge production, 
with negative long-run elasticities in the range of 0.461-0.605. This effect is found to be significant at 
the 1% level across all models.  
Turning to the short-run dynamics, the regression results for the conditional ECM of ln tAΔ ?  
reported in panel II of Table 2 show several important features. In particular, most coefficients are 
statistically significant at the conventional levels. In first-differenced form, all coefficients have signs 
consistent with the long-run estimates. Interestingly, except for the coefficients of ln tAΔ  and the 
coefficient of tRLRΔ  in Model D, all coefficients have magnitudes (in absolute terms) smaller than their 
long-run counterparts, suggesting that knowledge creation in the long run depends more critically on 
research intensity and financial sector policies. Furthermore, the coefficients of 1tECT −  (error-
correction term), which measure the speed of adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium value, are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and are correctly signed, i.e., negative. This implies that an 
error-correction mechanism exists so that the deviation from long-run equilibrium has a significant 
impact on the growth rate of ideas production. The results further support the finding of a cointegrated 
relationship between the variables reported earlier in Table 1.  
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Table 2: ARDL estimate of the augmented knowledge production function (1950-2005) 
 Model A 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N L=  
Model B 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N hL=  
Model C 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N aL=  
Model D 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N ahL=  
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
I. The long-run relationship ( . ln tDep A= ? ) 
Intercept 0.179 0.674 0.199 0.634 0.169 0.696 -0.018 0.965 
ln tA  0.823*** 0.000 0.828*** 0.000 0.842*** 0.000 0.861*** 0.000 
ln( / )tX Q  0.122*** 0.000 0.131*** 0.000 0.162*** 0.000 0.157*** 0.000 
tIRR  0.041*** 0.000 0.037*** 0.000 0.024*** 0.009 0.019** 0.041 
tDCP  -0.013 0.180 -0.014 0.143 -0.018* 0.075 -0.019* 0.075 
tRLR  -0.605*** 0.000 -0.603*** 0.000 -0.534*** 0.000 -0.461*** 0.002 
II. The short-run dynamics ( . ln tDep A= Δ ? ) 
Intercept 0.004 0.466 0.009* 0.089 0.010* 0.052 0.002 0.650 
ECTt-1 -0.886*** 0.000 -0.890*** 0.000 -0.880*** 0.000 -0.877*** 0.000 
ln tAΔ  5.700*** 0.000 5.698*** 0.000 5.787*** 0.000 5.828*** 0.000 
tIRRΔ  0.026** 0.017 0.024** 0.028 0.014 0.190 0.012 0.268 
tDCPΔ  -0.007 0.450 -0.007 0.394 -0.011 0.211 -0.012 0.183 
tRLRΔ  -0.513*** 0.009 -0.513*** 0.009 -0.501** 0.012 -0.515** 0.010 
III. Diagnostic 
checks 
Test-
stat. p-value 
Test-
stat. p-value 
Test-
stat. p-value 
Test-
stat. p-value 
2
NORMALχ  1.040 0.594 0.612 0.592 0.377 0.828 0.502 0.778 
2 (1)SERIALχ  0.111 0.739 0.265 0.207 0.525 0.468 0.466 0.495 
2 (2)SERIALχ  0.572 0.751 0.541 0.763 0.654 0.721 0.532 0.767 
2
ARCHχ  0.206 0.649 0.313 0.576 1.743 0.187 2.476 0.116 
2
WHITEχ  8.699 0.122 8.607 0.126 9.143 0.104 8.688 0.122 
Notes: A maximum lag length of two was used, following the results of the cointegration tests. The optimal lag structure for 
the resulting ARDL model was chosen using AIC. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
 
Overall, our results highlight the importance of reducing the extent of directed credit controls as 
well as reserve and liquidity requirements in order to facilitate innovative activity. However, financial 
restraint in the form of interest rate controls appears to be an effective device enabling entrepreneurs to 
obtain external finance and initiate knowledge creation. The results therefore highlight the importance 
of considering each component of financial reforms separately in the analysis of the impact of financial 
liberalization or repression on innovative activity. 
How could the above results be interpreted within the specific context of India? Firstly, our 
results indicate that interest controls have a positive effect on stimulating innovative activity in India. 
This finding is not surprising given that the deregulation of lending rates may increase the cost of 
borrowing and the removal of deposit interest floors may discourage savings. The former increases the 
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cost of capital for innovative entrepreneurs whereas the latter reduces the amount of credit available to 
them. The extent of interest rate restraints in India rose sharply following the direct intervention of the 
Reserve Bank of India in the setting of interest rates in 1963. Despite these regulations, the ratio of M3 
to GDP increased significantly from 24% to 51% during the period 1963-1988. This process of saving 
mobilization was much quicker than many other developing countries during the same period, and 
reflected a high propensity to save and confidence in the banking system. Given India’s closed capital 
account regime, high saving mobilization has provided ample domestic resources to facilitate inventive 
activity. Moreover, the imposition of interest rate ceilings from the 1960s to 1980s also ensured that 
innovative entrepreneurs who lacked funding were able to obtain credit at a reasonably low cost. 
The finding that interest rate restraints in India have a positive effect on innovation is intriguing 
and invites more discussion. Although the theoretical work of Emran and Stiglitz (2009) clearly 
suggests that financial restraint, in the form of deposit rate controls, directly encourages innovative 
activity in the industrial sector of a developing country, others argue that interest rate restraints may 
also encourage it indirectly via the channel of savings (see van Wijnbergen, 1982; Taylor, 1983; 
Stiglitz, 1994). In principle, savings and inventive activity are positively related since greater 
mobilization of savings increases the total amount of funds available for innovative activity. These 
insights invite further analysis and therefore an empirical test of whether the indirect effect of interest 
rate restraints on innovation via saving is operative in India is warranted.  
 
Table 3: The effect of interest rate restraints on savings rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.278 0.764 -2.473 -4.853 -2.861*** 
Per capita real GDP growth 0.016 0.021* 0.019*   
Per capita real income    0.449* 0.688*** 
Age dependency 0.195 0.015    
Young age dependency   0.567   
Old age dependency    0.690   
Real interest rate 0.007     
Agriculture output (% GDP) -0.862*** -0.788*** -0.948** -0.278  
Interest rate restraints (IRRt) 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.147*** 0.449* 0.196*** 
      
ARDL bounds test 3.528* 4.551** 5.094*** 6.033*** 4.413* 
ECM test -3.962* -4.133** -5.131*** -4.651*** -3.448 
Notes: the dependent variable is the ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP. Young dependents refer to population with ages 
0-14 and old age dependents are the population with ages 65 and above. Age dependency refers to the number of young and 
old dependents to working-age population with ages 15-64. The real interest rate is the bank deposit rate minus the rate of 
inflation. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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The effect of interest rate restraints on savings is examined using both the life cycle model and 
the permanent income hypothesis. The results reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 show that interest 
rate restraints exert a positive and significant effect on the savings rate. The estimates, however, 
provide little support for the use of a life cycle framework. Estimates based on the permanent income 
hypothesis reported in columns (4) and (5) give similar findings that savings rates respond positively to 
interest rate controls. However, it should be highlighted that household savings may be discouraged if 
bank deposit rates are suppressed to a very low level. As emphasized by Chiappori et al. (1995) and 
Emran and Stiglitz (2009), savings will respond positively only when an optimal level of deposit 
ceiling is chosen. On the whole, our results suggest that interest rate restraints have both direct and 
indirect effects on innovative activity in India. 
Secondly, our results suggest that directed credit programs tend to retard innovative activity. 
These findings are highly plausible for India. Due to the nationalization of banks in 1969, the allocation 
of credit has been mainly performed by government banks, which are often less efficient and subject to 
the risks of biased assessments. There is in fact evidence suggesting that finance in India has been 
subject to political interference. For instance, using data for the period 1992-1999, Cole (2009) finds 
that directed lending by government-owned banks increases significantly in election years and the 
surge is most prominent in the highly contested districts. Given that the provision of capital to 
industrial firms for innovative activity may be rather discretionary as it depends largely on general 
political objectives, it is unsurprising that these programs have been found to have negative or no 
impacts on expanding the amount of innovative capacity.  
Moreover, although the allocation of credit under the direction of the central bank has benefited 
some farmers and small traders by allowing them to have adequate access to finance, this may have 
also discouraged household savings and hence reduced funds available for innovative activity. An 
important component of financial liberalization is the easing of priority sector loans. Although the 
actual share of directed loans in total lending remains high in recent years, bank compliance with these 
targets reduced sharply after financial liberalization, following a change in the priority sector definition 
to include many other activities. As a result, most banks have avoided lending to innovative 
entrepreneurs who are deemed less creditworthy, thereby depriving the innovators of institutional 
lending for investing in inventive activity. Given that government intervention in credit allocation has 
not created new sources of innovative entrepreneurship, our results point to the importance of 
eliminating these distortionary policies so that funds can be allocated efficiently to fuel innovative 
investment.  
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Finally, our results also suggest that higher reserve and liquidity requirements have a 
detrimental effect on innovative activity in India. High reserve requirements before liberalization have 
provided the Reserve Bank of India with funds to buy government securities at low cost, leaving 
insufficient funds to finance innovative investment. However, a significant reduction in the ratios of 
reserve and liquidity requirements after the liberalization has greatly expanded the amount of loanable 
funds, which has contributed to an economic boom during the 1990s. Therefore, it appears that 
lowering these requirements can provide significantly more loanable funds, enabling more inventive 
activity to be carried out. Our results therefore argue in favor of a policy of deregulation in the financial 
system by way of reducing reserve and liquidity requirements in order to boost innovative activity. 
Nevertheless, as Aghion et al. (2004) have shown, unrestricted financial liberalization may 
induce instability. While financial repression may not be desirable, the evidence presented in this paper 
does provide some support for the argument that some form of financial restraint may promote 
innovation in developing countries. However, as noted by Honohan and Stiglitz (2001) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003b), both financial liberalization and financial restraint are more likely to work well in 
environments with strong regulatory capacity. Although the legal system in India was originally based 
on the British model that emphasizes protection of property rights, India ended up with a much less 
effective institutional framework since the legal system was modified in a way that benefited the small 
number of Europeans that settled in and ran the economy (Mishkin, 2006). This highlights the 
importance of strengthening the institutional framework so that financial policies can be effectively 
carried out to deepen technological development.  
 
7. Robustness 
7.1. Diagnostic checks 
The results reported in panel III of Table 2 show that the regression specifications fit 
remarkably well. All models pass the diagnostic tests against non-normal residuals, serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. The structural stability of the 
knowledge production equation is examined using the cumulative sum (CUSUM) tests on the recursive 
residuals. The tests are able to detect systematic changes in the regression coefficients. The results (not 
reported) indicate that the test statistics lie within the 5% confidence interval bands, suggesting that 
there is no structural instability in the residuals of the knowledge production equation. 
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7.2. Alternative estimators 
 
Table 4: Alternative estimators for the augmented long-run knowledge production function   
 Model A 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N L=  
Model B 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N hL=  
Model C 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N aL=  
Model D 
( / ) ( / )t tX Q N ahL=  
I. FM-OLS Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.847 0.477 0.769 0.518 0.074 0.953 -0.649 0.602 
ln tA  0.991*** 0.000 1.013*** 0.000 1.108*** 0.000 1.174*** 0.000 
ln( / )tX Q  0.339*** 0.000 0.354*** 0.000 0.408*** 0.000 0.382*** 0.000 
tIRR  0.005 0.848 0.004 0.875 0.049* 0.064 0.063** 0.020 
tDCP  -0.106*** 0.000 -0.108*** 0.000 -0.123*** 0.000 -0.124*** 0.000 
tRLR  -2.470*** 0.000 -2.424*** 0.000 -2.270*** 0.000 -2.102*** 0.000 
II. FM-UECM         
Intercept 1.664 0.120 2.049 0.210 1.211 0.476 0.137 0.934 
ln tA  0.943*** 0.000 1.039*** 0.000 1.171*** 0.000 1.286*** 0.000 
ln( / )tX Q  0.401*** 0.000 0.582*** 0.000 0.691*** 0.000 0.676*** 0.000 
tIRR  0.031 0.200 0.003 0.939 0.066* 0.062 0.121*** 0.001 
tDCP  -0.111*** 0.000 -0.163*** 0.000 -0.187*** 0.000 -0.194*** 0.000 
tRLR  -1.936*** 0.000 -3.942*** 0.000 -3.801*** 0.000 -2.789*** 0.000 
III. DOLS         
Intercept 0.853** 0.041 0.717* 0.059 0.487 0.212 0.179 0.615 
ln tA  0.772*** 0.000 0.787*** 0.000 0.811*** 0.000 0.832*** 0.000 
ln( / )tX Q  0.165*** 0.000 0.164*** 0.000 0.181*** 0.000 0.162*** 0.000 
tIRR  0.059*** 0.000 0.052*** 0.000 0.034*** 0.000 0.030*** 0.001 
tDCP  -0.036*** 0.001 -0.036*** 0.000 -0.039*** 0.000 -0.036*** 0.001 
tRLR  -0.553*** 0.005 -0.483*** 0.007 -0.325** 0.032 -0.209 0.135 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
While the ARDL approach is used to derive the main results of this paper, to provide a 
sensitivity check of the results we also consider three other single-equation estimators, namely the FM-
OLS procedure of Phillips and Hansen (1990), the FM-UECM estimator of Inder (1993) and the DOLS 
procedure of Stock and Watson (1993).5 Since our focus is on the long-run results, the short-run 
                                                 
5 The FM-OLS estimator directly estimates the long-run relationship by correcting the simple OLS estimator for serial 
correction and endogeneity in a semi-parametric way. The FM-UECM approach uses the same correction procedure to 
estimate the long-run parameters by incorporating adequate dynamics into the specification to avoid omitted lagged variable 
bias. The DOLS procedure involves regressing one of the I(1) variables on the remaining I(1) variables, the I(0) variables, 
leads and lags of the first difference of the I(1) variables, and a constant. It is similar to the UECM approach except that lead 
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dynamics of each estimator are not reported here for brevity. In general, these approaches give quite 
similar results compared to those estimated using the ARDL approach. As we can see from Table 4, all 
variables enter the long-run equation significantly at the conventional levels in most cases. Although 
the magnitude of the coefficients shows some small variations, the qualitative aspects of the results are, 
by and large, consistent with those obtained using the ARDL estimator. The main theme is that, with 
few exceptions, the R&D intensity measures and financial sector policies continue to be highly 
significant. Hence, we conclude that our main results are insensitive to the choice of estimators. 
 
7.3 Control variables 
This section addresses the issue regarding whether the previous results are robust to the 
inclusion of control variables, especially those that may have a crucial effect on inventive activity. The 
following control variables are considered. First, there is an established literature arguing that 
innovative activity is positively associated with international R&D spillovers (see Coe and Helpman, 
1995). Our measure of knowledge spillovers via the channel of imports (SPIt) follows the approach of 
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998). It considers bilateral trade between India and 
20 OECD countries. Second, the number of patent applications may be affected by a significant change 
in patent laws. A strengthening patent protection framework may prevent the free flows of ideas and 
retard technological development. But on the other hand, it may enhance the innovators’ ability to 
recoup expensive R&D costs, thereby encouraging further innovation. The intellectual property rights 
index (IPRt) constructed by Park and Lippoldt (2005) is used to capture the extent of patent protection. 
The missing years are interpolated. 
Third, we use the tariff rate, which is measured by import duties over total imports, to capture 
the effect of trade barriers (TBt). Fourth, technology transfer in India may have occurred through 
foreign investment. Although the ratio of FDI to GDP may be an appropriate measure to capture this 
effect, data for FDI are only available from 1970. Therefore, we consider the number of technical 
collaborations (COLt) and the share of foreign firms in total firms (FFt) as the alternative measures. 
The latter is also interacted with distance to the frontier (DTFt) (measured by the US’s TFP over India’s 
TFP) to allow for the possibility that the ability of a developing country to absorb the frontier’s 
technology depends on the extent of foreign firm presence (see also Madsen et al., 2009).  
Although innovation activity may also depend on the depth of the financial system, the 
inclusion of an indicator of financial development in the specification may pose some difficulties. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
terms are involved in the estimation. By doing so, it corrects for potential endogeneity problems and small sample bias, and 
provides estimates of the cointegrating vectors which are asymptotically efficient. 
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There is now an established literature arguing that financial development is crucially shaped by 
financial sector policies (see, e.g., Demetriades and Luintel 1996; Ang 2008). As such, the inclusion of 
both an indicator of financial development and measures of financial policy as regressors in the same 
specification may pose some conceptual and econometric problems. Moreover, in a study that 
examines the effect of finance on income inequality in India, Ang (2009a) highlights the fact that 
despite attention having been paid to mitigate any problems associated with multicollinearity, entering 
both financial development and financial policy variables in the income inequality equation yields 
unsatisfactory econometric results. Our specification therefore excludes the indicators of financial 
development.6 
 
Table 5: Controlling for the effects of other macroeconomic variables 
 tCV  =  
lnSPIt 
tCV  =  
lnIPRt 
tCV  =  
lnTBt 
tCV  =  
lnCOLt 
tCV  =  
lnFFt 
tCV  =  
FFt x lnDTFt 
Intercept 0.179 -0.366 -0.006 0.188 0.546 -0.057 
ln tA  0.824*** 0.886*** 0.839*** 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.852*** 
ln( / )tN L  0.123*** 0.109*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.162*** 0.133*** 
tIRR  0.039*** 0.027** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.025** 0.029*** 
tDCP  -0.138 -0.021* -0.018 -0.013 -0.013 -0.145 
tRLR  -0.608*** -0.646*** -0.642*** -0.606*** -0.523*** -0.531*** 
tCV  -0.034 -0.082 0.015 -0.001 0.032** 1.821*** 
       
ARDL bounds test 4.777*** 4.934*** 3.904** 3.658** 6.078*** 5.569*** 
ECM test -4.534** -5.035*** -4.827** -4.547** -6.076*** -5.683*** 
Notes: CVt = control variable, which includes: SPIt = spillovers of R&D international stocks; IPRt = intellectual property 
rights protection; TBt = trade barriers (import duties / total imports); COLt = number of collaborations with foreign firms; 
FFt = the share of foreign firms in the total number of firms; and DTFt = distance to the frontier (US’s TFP / India’s TFP). 
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
In the remaining analyses, the estimates are derived based on Model A using only the ARDL 
estimator. Moreover, for space reasons, only the long-run estimates and cointegration test statistics are 
reported. The estimates reported in Table 5 show that our core results remain robust to the inclusion of 
these control variables. Except for the share of foreign firms in total firms and its interaction with the 
distance to the frontier (columns 5 and 6) for which positive significant effects are found, all control 
                                                 
6 Venture capital funds may potentially play a more important intermediary role in providing capital to small and young 
innovative firms, which are generally plagued with high levels of uncertainty, than alternative sources of funds raised 
through banks or stock markets. However, an examination of this issue is not possible in the present context given that 
venture capital data for India are first available in 1996, following the establishment of an organized venture capital industry 
in India in the same year.  
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variables (CVt) turn out to have insignificant effects on innovative activity. Importantly, we continue to 
find fairly strong evidence of cointegration in all regressions. Consistent findings with those obtained 
earlier, in Table 2, suggest that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these control variables. 
 
7.4 Individual and overall effects of financial repression 
Financial policies may be jointly implemented and therefore the underlying financial policy 
variables may be highly correlated. This concern is addressed by: 1) entering each type of financial 
policy separately in the regressions, and 2) providing a composite measure of financial repression 
capturing all three repressionist policies. We first look at how each type of financial policy affects 
innovative activity. To conserve space, only the long-run results and the cointegration test statistics are 
reported in Table 6. In each regression, we continue to find strong support for cointegration. The results 
reported in columns (1) to (3) give evidence consistent with the earlier results, providing some support 
for the proposition that our results are robust to different specifications and perhaps are also unlikely to 
be subject to multicollinearity problems.  
In column (4), we consider the overall effect that repressionist policies may have on innovative 
activity. The aggregate measure is obtained by the first principal component of IRRt, DCPt and RLRt 
given that there exists only one dominant principal component with an eigenvalue of greater than one. 
However, the coefficient of this variable turns out to be statistically insignificant. This result along with 
our mixed findings regarding the effects of financial policies on innovative activity indeed highlights 
the importance of considering each component of these policies separately in order to avoid 
aggregation bias (see also Ang 2009b). 
 
Table 6: The effects of individual repressionist policy and overall financial repression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.319 -0.935** -0.489 -0.399 
ln tA  0.815*** 0.884*** 0.865*** 0.819*** 
ln( / )tN L  0.063*** 0.052** 0.082*** 0.057*** 
tIRR  0.029**    
tDCP   -0.009   
tRLR    -0.314*  
tFR     -0.399 
     
ARDL bounds test 8.262*** 6.912*** 5.467** 6.772*** 
ECM test -5.364*** -4.786*** -4.379*** -4.735*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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7.5 Further robustness checks 
It is probable that our results may be sensitive to the estimation periods chosen given that a 
majority of the reforms occurred in the second half of the sample. The first two columns in Table 7 
report the estimates for the periods 1960-2005 and 1970-2005. The estimates are largely consistent 
with the previous findings. Column 3 provides results based on alternative measure of DCPt where it is 
measured based on the actual share of directed credit in total credit. It is evident that our results remain 
insensitive to this consideration, given that our measure of directed credit programs and the actual share 
of directed credit in total credit shows a high correlation structure of 0.94. While the results are 
insensitive to the choice of the measure, the former is preferred since it is consistent with previous 
studies (see, e.g., Demetriades and Luintel, 1996; Ang, 2009).  
Finally, following Madsen et al. (2009), we use trademarks as the alternative measure of 
product variety. Gao and Hitt (2004) argue that trademarks contain more useful information about 
product differentiation that is not included in other measures of product variety such as income and 
labor force. Moreover, they reflect non-trivial variation among products. It is evident that the estimates 
do not show any significant variations (see column 4) except that the coefficient of RLRt now becomes 
smaller. This finding provides some support for the proposition that the estimates are not sensitive to 
the way product variety is measured.7  
 
Table 7: Alternative sample periods, measures of directed credit program and product variety 
 (1) Period =  1960-2005 
(2) Period =  
1970-2005 
(3) tDCP  =  
directed credit  
(% total credit) 
(4) ( / )tN L  =  
no. trademarks / 
labor force 
Intercept 0.202 0.286 0.348 -2.245*** 
ln tA  0.828*** 0.822*** 0.798*** 0.951*** 
ln( / )tN L  0.128*** 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.108*** 
tIRR  0.038*** 0.031* 0.041*** 0.019* 
tDCP  -0.017* -0.024 -0.002 -0.019** 
tRLR  -0.665*** -0.674*** -0.571*** -0.265** 
ARDL bounds test 5.104*** 3.373* 5.672*** 5.832*** 
ECM test -4.505** -2.989 -5.492*** -5.360*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
                                                 
7 Financial sector policies may have a direct effect on research intensity and hence bias our results. To allow for this 
possibility, we have: (1) specified Eq. (4) without research intensity; and (2) regress research intensity on financial sector 
policies. In both cases, the results indicate that nearly all the coefficients of financial policies are statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, these alternative econometric specifications provide little evidence of cointegration and also fail a number of 
diagnostic checks. These findings suggest that the equations are either misspecified or subject to omitted variable bias. We 
therefore do not consider these alternative specifications.  
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8. Conclusions 
Financial repression or restraint, which is prevalent in many developing countries, may impede 
the development or adoption of new production techniques, thereby retarding technological deepening. 
Greater availability of financial resources, which can be achieved through financial reforms, offers the 
opportunities for the utilization of existing technologies and development of new techniques. The 
stimulus to innovation is therefore a result of decreasing financial constraints faced by firms, and at the 
broader level, a reduction of restraints in the financial system. Financial liberalization lifts restrictions 
in financial systems and spurs technological innovation. Thus, the crucial role of finance in the analysis 
of technological development cannot be understated.  
While recent endogenous growth theories have highlighted the important role of finance in 
facilitating inventive activity, so far there has been little effort attempting to explore the role of finance 
in knowledge production. If innovation is to be encouraged, which type of financial sector policy 
should be formulated to facilitate it? This study contributes to the literature by providing fresh evidence 
on how each type of financial sector policy, including interest rate controls, directed credit programs 
and reserve and liquidity requirements, influences the evolution of knowledge creation using India as 
the case study. An understanding of how inventive activity reacts to each type of financial policy 
provides policy makers with some guidance in undertaking the institutional reform of financial markets 
and intermediaries. 
Employing the ARDL and ECM cointegration tests, the empirical evidence shows a significant 
long-run relationship between knowledge production and its determinants. After documenting these 
basic cointegration results, we derive the long-run estimates using several different estimators. The 
qualitative aspects of the results are insensitive to the choice of estimators and measures of research 
intensity. The estimated results based on annual data for over half a century suggest that knowledge 
creation critically depends on the stock of knowledge and R&D input, providing strong support for the 
use of an innovation-based growth framework in the analysis. The results also highlight the important 
role of formulating appropriate financial policies in order to ease the acquisition of technical know-how 
and in stimulating innovation. Our findings indicate that financial sector policies appear to have mixed 
effects on knowledge creation. Specifically, financial repressionist policies, in the form of the 
significant presence of directed credit controls and high reserve requirements, appear to have retarded 
knowledge creation through preventing the adoption of improved machinery with embodied 
technological change. 
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However, the results do not provide full support for the financial liberalization thesis, given that 
policy intervention in the form of interest rate restraints appears to be an effective device for enhancing 
knowledge creation. To encourage innovation, greater emphasis should be given to allocating finance 
to small high-tech firms, which often occupy an important role in the process of technological 
innovation. Imposing interest rate ceilings on lending to innovative entrepreneurs can foster 
technological development by making finance more affordable. There is also significant potential for 
developing the venture capital market as it becomes a more important source of finance for innovative 
entrepreneurs.  
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